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Introduction 
In the preface of  Philosophy of  Right, Hegel writes that «each 
individual is in any case a child of  his time; thus philosophy, too, is its 
own time comprehended in thoughts». As one of  the primary institutions of  
his time, Hegel sought to discover what was rational about the 
institution of  private property and whether it contributed to human 
freedom. By seeking «standards of  rationality within existing systems 
of  thought and forms of  life»1, Hegel engages in a critique of  private 
property while recognizing it as the apotheosis of  freedom in the 
1800s2. Property, for Hegel, does not simply represent or facilitate 
freedom: property is freedom. Accordingly, writes Seyla Benhabib, 
Hegel provides a «systematic analysis of  the norms of  personality, 
property and contract» all of  which are «presupposed by modern 
exchange»3, which is facilitated by the kind of  burgeoning 
liberal/capitalist market economies that were coming to dominate 
Hegel’s era.  
The goal of  Philosophy of  Right, particularly in the sections which 
address property as the primary abstract right, is to determine what 
kinds of  conditions must be present for individuals to develop as 
legal/juridical persons in a way that is distinct from other animals. 
Unlike other animals, who are wholly dependent upon nature to 
survive, persons are free, and persons create institutions. For Hegel, 
institutions provide the conditions that permit human freedom, and it 
is by working within institutions that the things that make up the free 
individual are developed. These things are property. The abstract right 
to property is secured by the institution of  private property, and the 
institution of  private property is created and maintained by a social 
1 S.B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of  Liberalism, University of  Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1989, p. 10.  
2 D.E. Rose, Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right: A Reader’s Guide, Continuum, New 
York 2007, p. 150 n4.  
3 S. Benhabib, «Obligation, contract, and exchange: on the significance of  
Hegel’s abstract Right» in Z.A. Pelczynski (eds by), The State and Civil Society in 
Hegel’s Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 161.  
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community that, in turn, is conscious of  the importance of  private 
property for the development of  the free individual. Unlike the 
heuristic starting points of  liberal theorists such as Hobbes and 
Locke, Hegel’s abstract right is not situated in a state of  nature filled 
with unsocialized beings who spontaneously develop powerful 
systems of  rights and duties. Rather, the persons in Hegel’s abstract 
right are fully socialized by their family, civil society, and the state in 
order to prepare them for property ownership, the creation and 
enforcement of  contracts, and other social relationships4.  
Because of  the importance of  property for the establishment of  
personhood, the state must permit broad discretion for the 
acquisition, use, and alienation of  property. From Hegel’s perspective, 
this broad discretion can only be exercised through institutions that 
define and protect private property. To that extent, Peter Stillman 
writes, «Hegel’s thought is grounded on property» where «the right to 
property is the basis of  the rights to life and freedom»5.  
However, Hegel’s theory of  the political state (hereditary 
monarchy) is authoritarian, and it is unlikely that authoritarian states 
would permit the kind of  extensive property rights and personal 
freedoms that Hegel proposes. This results in what may prove to be a 
fatal flaw in Hegel’s political philosophy: by arguing for particular 
rights and freedoms at the social level, Hegel concurrently argues for 
political institutions that are not capable of  respecting, nor obligated 
to respect, those rights. By trying to incorporate Hegel’s property 
theory into contemporary property jurisprudence – as I intend to do 
here – any attempt to work around this flaw raises up the twin issues 
of  rehabilitation and cherry picking. Rehabilitation involves either 
justifying or explaining away unacceptable aspects of  Hegel’s – or 
anyone else’s – philosophy. Cherry-picking, or selective reading, 
permits a commentator to latch onto certain aspects of  a thinker’s 
oeuvre while disregarding the rest, much of  which is (as it is in Hegel) 
illiberal, sexist, or authoritarian. It is a kind of  reverse rehabilitation: it 
permits commentary upon an individual topic without having to 
rehabilitate, or justify, other aspects. According to Robert Pippin, it is 
improper to cherry-pick sections of  Philosophy of  Right «as if  they were 
4 J. Ritter, «Person and Property in Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right (§§ 34-81)» in 
R. Pippin and O. Höffe (eds by), Hegel on Ethics and Politics, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 121.  
5 P. Stillman, «Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel’s and Marx’s 
Political Thought», in J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (eds by), Property, New 
York University Press, New York 1980, p. 130.  
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individual chapters that one could consult about Hegel’s views on 
individual topics such as ‘property’»6. This raises the issue of  whether 
Hegel’s property theory can be evaluated apart from the rest of  
Philosophy of  Right and from his other writings. Axel Honneth suggests 
that it can, and provides a way to avoid charges of  cherry picking 
while justifiably refusing to rehabilitate parts of  Hegel’s philosophy.  
In Suffering from Indeterminacy, Honneth writes, «we can reach a 
productive understanding» of  Philosophy of  Right without either 
“rehabilitating” Hegel’s concept of  the state or «calling upon the state 
as a substance»7. This is because, for Honneth, Hegel’s concept of  
the state, and his concept of  “spirit”, cannot be rehabilitated due to 
their authoritarian implications. Honneth terms this the indirect mode 
of  reactualizing the Philosophy of  Right; the direct mode entails a 
criticism that renders Hegel irrelevant because of  the clearly 
objectionable positions he takes in terms of  the state. So, like 
Honneth, I aim to show how «the fundamental aim of  the text and its 
construction as a whole», particularly in regards to the moral 
foundation of  Hegel’s property theory, can be understood when 
Hegel’s «basic conception of  the state has been rejected in principle»8. 
I therefore propose to indirectly reactualize the property theory of  
Philosophy of  Right in light of  Hegel’s ethical, legal, and political theory, 
but – like Honneth – I will show that a rejection of  Hegel’s 
conception of  the state nevertheless permits the acceptance of  his 
conception of  property. To that end, I construct a Hegelian property 
law that recognizes the following:  
 
 property is developmental, meaning that persons are not born 
ready for the ethical community nor for the state of  nature, 
and property is therefore necessary for the development of  
persons as moral and social beings;  
 the institution of  private property is justified to the extent it 
contributes to individual freedom and individuality9; and  
 in contrast to Hegel’s authoritarian state, a broadly libe-
ral/capitalist social and political economy is required to realize 
6 R. Pippin, «Introduction» in R. Pippin, O. Höffe, op. cit., p. 8.  
7 A. Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, Van Gorcum, Amsterdam 2000, p. 
18.  
8 Ivi, p. 19. I will presume that there is nothing particularly difficult about 
rejecting Hegel’s preferred state, to wit, a hereditary monarchy.  
9 P. Stillman, «Property, Freedom, and Individuality», cit., p. 134. 
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the institution of  private property and the free and 
individualized persons produced by it.   
 
The argument will proceed as follows. When the state secures the 
property right through the establishment of  institutions which codify 
the rights, define it, and punish those who violate it, it is bound by a 
certain logic: only private property creates free individuals, and 
persons are free to the extent they can exchange property in accord 
with rational desire. These free individuals in turn perpetuate the 
institution of  private property by owning and exchanging property on 
the terms established by abstract right, which promotes the 
development of  persons by permitting them to freely exercise their 
will upon the internal and external world. Because of  the importance 
of  property for personhood, the state must conscientiously choose to 
allow broad discretion for the acquisition, use, and alienation of  
property, and this kind of  freedom is only guaranteed in 
liberal/democratic political communities.  
 
1. Property for Personhood 
 
Unlike Locke – who simplifies ownership as the “mixing” of  self-
ownership and labor upon previously unowned things – Hegel 
provides a deeply nuanced approach to property ownership which 
carefully incorporates several key concepts that define the Idealist 
philosophy of  his day. Accordingly, the following sections explore 
Hegel’s personhood argument, which begins with the importance of  
property for personhood and then moves to the relationship of  
property to Hegel’s conceptions of  recognition, mediation, respect, 
and, finally, freedom. 
In § 41, Hegel writes that 
 
[t]he rationale of  property is to be found not in the satisfaction of  needs 
but in the supersession of  the pure subjectivity of  personality. In his 
property a person exists for the first time as reason. Even if  my freedom 
is here realised first of  all in an external thing, and so falsely realised, 
nevertheless abstract personality in its immediacy can have no other 
embodiment save one characterised by immediacy. 
 
According to Alan Patten, Hegel initially assumes that persons 
occupy the social world, and then asks what kinds of  institutions 
must exist in such a world. The social world cannot be one consisting 
solely of  individuals and institutions; this, according to Patten, is the 
71
standard liberal understanding of  the relationship between the 
individual and the community, and one that Hegel seeks to challenge. 
Individuals also need subjectivity, without which there are no property 
rights, no contracts, and no legitimate punishment: persons as subjects 
– and not as mere individuals – have rights, make contracts, or suffer 
the consequences of  their actions. Without those phenomena, all of  
which require at least two people for their realization, there is no 
social world for persons to occupy10.  
Subjectivity, Patten explains, is a person’s independence from, and 
knowledge of, their situation, circumstances, and desires. Subjectivity 
is the basis for individual personality, and personality is the distance 
between oneself  and one’s situation. It is what gives persons the 
ability to evaluate and reflect on their ends11. According to Benhabib, 
this right of  personality is neither natural or the product of  reason: 
rather, it is the result of  a variety of  historical processes, including the 
market economy, the struggle for recognition, reform, revolution, 
Christianity, the «spread of  bourgeois market relations», and Bildung12. 
Whereas Bildung is constituted by the social experiences of  education 
and culture, it is the institution of  private property, Hegel will argue, 
that uniquely allows persons to use their education and culture as the 
material with which they construct their personalities as free 
subjects13.  
Personality, therefore, is not given a priori: must be developed. To 
develop as a person, a human being must «at a minimum take 
possession of  her body and acquire property in external things»14. 
For Hegel, all individuals have the capacity develop into a person, but 
we only do so when we first will our possession over life and body 
and then over other things15. The institutions that regulate property, 
to the extent they permit the free development of  personhood, are in 
turn «derive[d] from our conception of  ourselves as persons, that is, 
individuals who can abstract the contents from particular states of  
10 A. Patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, p. 
144. 
11 Ivi, p. 145.  
12 S. Benhabib, op. cit., pp. 168-173. 
13 A. Patten, op. cit., p. 146. 
14 C.J. P. Di Salvo, «Hegel’s Torment: Poverty and the Rationality of  the 
Modern State» in A. Buchwalter (eds by), Hegel and Capitalism, State University of  
New York Press, Albany 2015, p. 108.  
15 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of  Right, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1991, §47. All references to The Philosophy of  Right herein are cited by 
section number and refer to this edition.  
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desire and recognise ourselves as possessors of  will»16. Hans-
Christoph Schmidt am Busch explains that Hegel derives the 
institution of  private property from personhood by way of  four 
theses: 
  
(1) “The person must give himself  an external sphere of  freedom” (§ 
41). 
(2) This sphere of  freedom must consist of  entities that are 
“immediately different and separable” from the person. 
(3) The human body, human capacities, and external things can be said to 
meet Hegel’s criterion of  difference and separability; however, they do so 
in different ways. 
(4) The person can only give himself  a “sphere of  its freedom” in 
private property17. 
 
For Schmidt am Busch, it Hegel’s position that «as a person, the 
individual claims to decide on his own which goals to pursue; 
therefore, the external sphere of  freedom he gives himself  must 
consist of  private property»18. This external sphere, made up of  
external entities that are different and separate from the individual, is 
the social world consisting of  other things and persons. In contrast to 
Locke’s property theory, which presupposes an individual with the a 
priori ability and willingness to consent to another’s acquisition of  
property, Hegel presupposes an individual who develops into a 
person as they learn how to acquire and trade property pursuant to 
social norms. These norms are comprised, in part, by the institution 
of  private property itself. The kinds of  actions that constitute 
property institutions (including the acquisition, use, and alienation 
property by trade and exchange) are the types of  actions through 
which persons experience the freedoms inherent in the willful 
acquisition, use, or alienation of  property, and the relevant 
institutions promote freedom to the extent they promote broad 
property and contractual rights. In this way, Schmidt am Busch 
concludes, «the institution of  private property can be derived from 
[Hegel’s] concept of  the person»19. If  the institutions do not promote 
16 D. Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, in «The Philosophical 
Quarterly», n. 130, 1983, pp. 45-62, 49. 
17 H.C. Schmidt am Busch, Personal Respect, Private Property, And Market 
Economy: What Critical Theory Can Learn From Hegel, in «Ethic Theory Moral 
Prac», n. 11, 2008, pp. 573–586, 579. 
18 Ivi, p, 581. 
19 Ivi; see also S. Benhabib, op. cit., p. 171: «the right of  property is deduced 
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these rights or severely limit them, then they similarly do not support 
the free development of  personhood. 
 
2. Recognition and the Mediation of  Subjectivity 
 
According to David Rose, personality requires property in order to 
demonstrate its particularity to the world. Persons assert themselves 
as free individuals by obtaining the things they desire20. The desire for 
things fills the will, which then manifests itself  through action in the 
world. By obtaining things, the rational desire to own becomes real in 
the actual ownership of  the thing, and the will becomes embodied in 
the world. The most important of  these desires is the desire for 
recognition, and recognition requires physical things for it to become 
real or objectified. Although it is less important in the Philosophy of  
Right than in Hegel’s other writings, recognition is necessary for the 
creation of  self-consciousness, which, in turn, is necessary for the 
objectification of  the will through the medium of  private property. 
Hegel makes this clear in § 40, writing that «a person, in 
distinguishing himself  from himself, relates himself  to another person, 
and indeed it is only as owners of  property that the two have 
existence (Dasein) for each other. Their identity in themselves acquires 
existence (Existenz) though the transference of  the property of  the 
one to the other by common will and with due respect of  the rights 
of  both – that is, by contract»21. It is not enough to will to own 
something and to then take initial possession of  it: the thing must be 
“ownerless”, which contemplates the «anticipated relation to others» 
(§ 51), whereby the inner act of  the willing person «that says 
something is mine must also become recognizable by others» (§ 51A). 
Unlike Locke’s property theory, which grants ownership based on a 
purely individualized relationship (e.g., the mixing of  labor) between 
person and thing, Hegel stresses that ownership can only be achieved 
by acting in the social world in the presence of  other persons, and it 
is recognition that makes this possible.  
The concept of  recognition as a key concept in Hegelian property 
is introduced in paragraphs 182-184 of  the Phenomenology of  Spirit. 
Here, Hegel writes 
 
from right of  personality». 
20 D. E. Rose, op. cit., p. 60. 
21 See also G.W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of  Right, cit., §§ 71-72. 
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this movement of  self-consciousness in relation to another self- 
consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of  one self-
consciousness, but this action of  the one has itself  the double 
significance of  being both its own action and the action of  the other as 
well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is 
nothing in it of  which it is not itself  the origin. The first does not have 
the object before it merely as it exists primarily for desire, but as 
something that has an independent existence of  its own, which, 
therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if  that object does not 
of  its own accord do what the first does to it...Each sees the other do the 
same as it does; each does itself  what it demands of  the other, and 
therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the 
same…They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another22. 
 
«Property is thus», writes Dudley Knowles, «an essential element 
of  self-consciousness»23.  
 
If  I am to determine myself, make something of  myself, the self  that is 
operated on must be recognisable by me in just the same way that it is 
recognised by others. If, therefore, we recognise the grasping of  an 
object as taking possession, we do so precisely because we identify the 
will of  the property holder in his grasp24. 
 
This effort to «make something of  oneself» constitutes the 
struggle for recognition, and, as Shlomo Avineri writes, property is a 
key moment in this struggle25. According to Steven Smith, «the desire 
for recognition is the quintessential human desire»: it is desiring the 
desire of  another26. Above all, persons desire to be treated with 
decency and respect, and they are in fact treated with decency and 
respect when their property is similarly treated. The right to 
recognition is therefore the right to dignity, respect, and civility, all of  
which require the presence of  others organized into a community, 
and community itself  arises through exchange and the institutions 
that promote it. As Michael Quante writes, it is through contract and 
exchange that property becomes the thing that mediates between two 
persons and thereby produces a «shared community of  will» in that 
22 Id., Phenomenology of  Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, pp. 182-
184; cited in D. Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, op. cit., p.  56.  
23 D. Knowles, op. cit., p. 57. 
24 Ivi, p. 50. 
25 S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of  the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1974, p. 89.  
26 S. B. Smith, op. cit., p. 116. 
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«both parties will the maintenance of  the institution of  property» and 
of  their right27. The result of  this mediation is the «moment of  
mutual recognition between subjects [that] can only be achieved 
through the mediating object of  property, contract, and abstract 
law»28. When individuals operate in a community of  reciprocal 
recognition, «the object of  property serves as a medium in and 
through which such recognition is manifested and given presence as a 
public sign»29. The object of  property is a social object because 
another person recognizes the other’s will in it. The crime of  theft, 
for example, is the breakdown in the recognition of  another’s will in 
their property: «crime is denial of  right because it fails to engage in 
any mutual recognition with others (§ 95)»30 . 
According to Honneth, recognition occurs when the property 
object becomes subject to my ability to say “yes” or “no” to another 
potential property owner’s offer to exchange her property for mine31. 
If  this exchange takes the form of  a promise to exchange in the 
future (e.g., «I hereby agree to sell you my tractor in 30 days»), then, 
despite the fact that no actual property has been exchanged, the 
willful act of  promising moves the physical/material alienation or 
transfer of  property into the realm of  moral obligation: here, the 
seller is obligated to perform an event in the future32. Conversely, 
even a thief  or robber recognizes the owner’s right to property by 
denying them their right to say “yes” or “no” to an exchange and 
thereby refusing to permit the owner to engage in the willful 
withdrawal of  their will from the thing itself.  
Property, however, does not merely meet an individual’s needs. For 
Hegel, objective property – the “things” of  the world – is the initial 
mediator between the intersubjectivities of  subjective subjects. 
According to Thom Brookes, the rational aspect of  property lies in 
the superseding of  the mere subjectivity of  personality (§ 41, § 41A), 
whereby «property is instrumental to our discovery of  how we can 
27 M. Quante, «“The Personality of  the Will” as the Principle of  Abstract 
Right: An Analysis of  §§ 34-40 of  Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right in Terms of  the 
Logical Structure of  the Concept», in R. Pippin, O. Höffe, op. cit., p. 98. 
28 J. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, Property, and the Feminine, 
University of  California Press, Berkeley 1998, p. 19.  
29 S. Benhabib, op. cit., p. 172. 
30 T. Brooks, «Political Philosophy» in Hegel Key Concepts, ed. M. Baur, 
Routledge, New York 2015, p. 81.  
31 A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, The MIT Press, Boston 1996, pp. 
18-19. 
32 Ivi, p. 51. 
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improve upon a mere subjective judgment about freedom»33. In other 
words, we discover our freedom through property when we 
manipulate it, transform it, or, most importantly, alienate it. In doing 
so, we also alienate our will by placing it into an object that is external 
to it.  
In another departure from Locke, who prioritized the acquisition 
aspect of  ownership, Hegel emphasizes the contractual elements of  
ownership in which the parties to a property transaction are briefly 
united in a common will34. Specifically, Hegel claims that we truly 
become owners not by acquiring property, but when we «cease to be 
an owner of  property» by getting rid of  it through a contract to sell it 
(§ 72). Hegel recognizes that the contractual or alienable element in 
property means that, for a brief  moment, structures such as 
residential buildings are neither house nor home but both for the 
parties – this is the moment where an owner’s will identifies with the 
next owner’s will in a «unity of  different wills» (§ 72-73):  
 
This relation of  will to will is the true distinctive ground in which 
freedom has its existence. This mediation whereby I no longer own 
property by means of  a thing and my subjective will, but also by means 
of  another will, and hence within the context of  a common (gemeinsamen) 
will, constitutes the sphere of  contract (§ 71). 
 
It is in the moment of  this profoundly important agreement (the 
«transition from property to contract») that the «contracting parties 
recognize each other as persons and owners of  property» (§ 71R; 
emphasis in original), and where the alienation of  property allows its 
soon-to-be former owner to experience their independence from it as 
the experience of  freedom from the thing itself. In this way, Hegelian 
property serves as a way to mediate the intersubjectivity between 
persons: it is not merely the “receptacle” of  individual will or labor as 
liberal Lockean property theory imagines it to be. It permits persons 
to recognize oneself  and one another, and property holding therefore 
permits recognition between conflicting persons and their competing 
wills. Because property transfers are social interactions, they therefore 
require extensive moral foundations as well as social institutions for 
their success. The primary moral foundation is the idea of  respect.  
 
33 T. Brooks, op. cit., p. 79. 
34 J. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 49.  
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3. Ownership and Respect 
 
Respect is the first “commandment” of  Hegelian property: «be a 
person and respect others as persons» (§ 36). For Robert Pippin, 
Hegel is clear that we must respect abstract rights, including those 
that pertain to property35. Respect, Avineri writes, is keyed to 
recognition, and it is «[t]hrough property [that] man’s existence is 
recognized by others since the respect others show to his property by 
not trespassing on it reflects their acceptance of  him as a person»36. 
Respect also permits us to «identify ourselves through the medium of  
our property and to accord others equivalent status as they express 
and recognise themselves in their property»37. Ownership rights 
impose constraints and duties on other persons, whereby «my having 
these rights involves others recognizing me as a source of  moral 
constraint and thus as a locus of  respect»38.  
Respect is, therefore, recognition of  the duty not to interfere with 
another’s property right, and it is the foundation of  the moral 
prohibition against theft. Hegel writes in § 113 that the origin of  the 
moral duty not to interfere occurs when an owner recognizes the legal 
action whereby «I retain my property and let the other party to retain 
his». According to Schmidt am Busch, respect is also a key element in 
Hegel’s capitalism. Respect «gives individuals who wish to cooperate 
economically a prima facie reason to favor market-like exchanges over 
state-regulated distributions of  goods»39. Market exchanges can 
therefore «be understood as possible institutionalizations of  personal 
respect», due to the realization that «the structure of  personal 
freedom seems to be larger in market economies than in state-
regulated economies»40. For Hegel, «there is thus no recognition of  
an individual as a person without recognition of  individual property 
rights»41, and it is only through mutual recognition with another 
person, Brooks writes, that freedom is possible: «It is through 
someone else’s recognition of  a thing as mine that [freedom’s] 
existence becomes more “actual” and determinate»42. 
35 R. Pippin, «Introduction», cit., p. 8. 
36 S. Avineri, op. cit., p. 136. 
37 D. Knowles, op. cit., p. 55. 
38 J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1988, p. 303. 
39 H.C. Schmidt am Busch, op. cit., p. 535, n31. 
40 Ivi, p. 582.  
41 Ivi, p. 581. 
42 T. Brooks, op. cit., citing Hegel, Philosophy of  Right, §§ 71,75.  
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4. Property and Freedom 
 
Private property provides a concrete expression of  independence 
which is the essential part of  being a person43. For Hegel, freedom is 
the will, and by putting their will in a thing through acquisition and 
use (§ 44), a person’s subjective will becomes “actual will” in property 
by gaining embodiment in the external world (§ 45). When persons 
enter the world, they act in and upon it. When persons are not 
oppressed or restrained, they freely manipulate the world’s resources, 
and their free will gives itself  existence by reference to an external 
«sphere of  freedom» (§ 41), «a collection of  external object over 
which it alone has power». The interior life becomes “exteriorized” 
(§ 43) in civil society through trade and exchange, which are framed 
by the legal contract. If  the law allows for considerable ‘conflict’ in 
the pursuit of  trade and exchange, then the law is consonant with 
freedom.44 Conversely, persons who are not permitted to trade or 
exchange their property are not free.45  
Importantly, freedom is not a feeling or intuition. As Richard A. 
Davis writes, genuine freedom requires a «definite contact with 
objective reality»46. At each step, Davis continues, «property is thus 
the agent of  this development of  a consciousness of  the ethical 
substance. Whether considered in its role in education, or in its more 
traditional, “pure” form, property is ultimately responsible for 
bringing into existence an objective form of  the concept of  freedom 
that was one of  the original goals of  the will (§ 4)»47.  
True to the spirit of  the dialectic, Hegel is also aware of  the 
potential for private property to create moral ruin. According to 
Joachim Ritter, property can, through «diremption and difference» 
(§§ 33 and 182), «reduce all of  human existence to buying and selling, 
thereby “loosening” the relations that bonded persons together in the 
first place in order to create the civil law». Here, «each individual is his 
own end and everything else counts for nothing» (§ 182A)48. Despite 
this potential for ruin, Hegel nevertheless insists that «property must 
43 A. Patten, op. cit., p. 149. 
44 J. Ritter, op. cit., p. 121. 
45 Ivi, p. 112. 
46 R.A. Davis, The Conjunction of  Property and Freedom in Hegel's Philosophy of  
Right, in «Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung», n. 43, 1989, pp. 111- 123, 
119. 
47 Ivi, p. 123. 
48 J. Ritter, op. cit., p.113. 
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possess the character of  private property» (§ 46). As Ritter notes, the 
«externality of  civil society that presents the dual spectacle of  
extravagance and distress also represents for Hegel the actual 
existence of  human freedom»49, and freedom would be impossible 
without the ability to acquire and get rid of  goods and assets50.  
Much like the right to alienate one’s property, the duty of  
noninterference also bridges the important connection between 
private property and freedom51. Hegel, Patten writes, derives this 
connection from Fichte. For Fichte (and, consequently, Hegel) private 
property as an institution makes personality possible; because of  the 
importance of  personality, private property is justified in placing 
others under duties such as the duty of  non-interference52. Private 
property is therefore the result of  a person having the right to a 
sphere of  the external world that is free from intervention by 
others53. For both Fichte and Hegel, the «[p]rivate property system 
centres on the way in which private property provides the individual 
property holder with a concrete perception of  his own agency and in 
this way helps to constitute him as a free person»54. Non-interference, 
as a necessary feature of  private property, also «plays an important 
role in self-understanding whereby the individual defines themselves 
in relation (and contrast) with others»55. 
However, it is important to understand that Hegelian property is 
not merely instrumental towards personhood and freedom. It is not a 
means to those ends: rather, it is constitutive of  them. The right over 
the acquisition, use, and alienation property is an expression of  free 
will, where the right is constituted by the «ensemble of  conditions 
that express and realize the conception of  the person as free and 
equal, or, more exactly, a possessing the moral powers proper to this 
conception of  the person»56. Put another way, right is the second 
49 Ivi, p. 114. 
50 D. Knowles, op. cit., p. 57. 
51 A. Patten, op. cit., p. 139. 
52 Ivi, p. 152. 
53 Ivi, p. 153. 
54 Ivi, p. 157. 
55 J. Waldron, op. cit., p. 376. As Schroeder notes, there is a substantial 
difference between the brute fact of  possession as exclusion and the right to 
exclude others from interfering with one’s possessions. J. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 
42.  
56 P. Benson, «The Priority of  Abstract Right and Constructivism in Hegel’s 
Legal Philosophy», in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld, D. G. Carlson (eds by), Hegel and 
Legal Theory, Routledge, New York 1991, p. 179. 
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nature of  the will: it is not “natural” or prior to or independent of  
free activity, but the result of  it57.  
To summarize thus far: Hegel asks what kinds of  actions are the 
actions of  free persons. He concludes that free persons are able to 
trade material objects amongst themselves with considerable 
autonomy and without undue oversight by a coercive authority. 
Different social orders, manifested through various methods for the 
implementation of  Sittlichkeit, may require different contractual or 
property norms, but, in order to be rational and to embody freedom, 
they must provide core protections through a regime that protects 
private property and the freedom to contract58. It is Hegel’s idea of  
abstract right that justifies these freedoms.  
 
5. Abstract Right as a Product of  Social Life 
 
Hegel uses the idea of  abstract right to determine what kind of  
human actions are necessary for freedom, and concludes that human 
freedom is only possible if  persons can own and transfer property 
without substantial restriction. Because abstract rights must be 
concretized and contextualized by custom and social life, the abstract 
property and contract right is then shaped by morality and finally 
ethical life, neither of  which fully subsume Hegel’s insistence that 
freedom consists in the right to satisfy the will through free and 
consensual ownership and transfer of  property. For Peter Stillman, 
the abstract property right operates as a kind of  idealized property 
right, where persons are equal in their capacity for property 
ownership, and where «full and complete» ownership is dependent 
solely on their personhood and «irrelevant of  social status or 
hierarchy»59. The corresponding idealized – yet still abstract – 
contract right is the way to move property along to others without 
domination or coercion. The persons who own and transfer property 
within abstract right operate freely, and the right to freely perform 
these specific actions is essential to any conception of  social 
freedom60.  
The abstract property right is complex, but it is best understood as 
57 Ibidem. 
58 C. McCracken, «Hegel and the Autonomy of  Contract Law», in M. Salter 
(eds by), Hegel and Law, Ashgate, Hants 2003, p. 161.  
59 P. Stillman, «Property, Freedom, and Individuality», cit.; Id., «Property, 
Contract, and Ethical Life», cit., p. 206. 
60 Ibidem. 
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the final, most elemental right that remains after a person’s social and 
cultural contingencies have been “stripped”. It is the right that must 
remain in order to preserve a person’s freedom. Therefore, various 
social contingencies will determine how the right is enjoyed in a 
variety of  civil societies and states, but the right must be in place if  
the society is to promote freedom. Viewed in this way, property rights 
are the logical outcome of  an ethical society populated with moral 
beings, in which rightsholders are fully socialized by their families, 
their society, and their state. According to Brian O’Connor, «[a]bstract 
right is the sphere of  the agent within a system of  laws. Fulfillment 
of  one’s role within that sphere requires no more than simple 
adherence to the laws…Morality, by sharp contrast, refers to the 
perspective of  the subject as an independent agent on what that 
subject ought to do»61. As Ludwig Siep writes, the abstract property 
right «presupposes institutions for its own realization [and] can also 
be limited by those institutions», primarily by the «state’s own 
“capacity for action”»62. The institutions that govern and protect 
abstract right are not independent from the law or from civil society: 
the abstract person always exists within the various institutions of  
civil society and ethical life. In other words: only persons who are 
fully socialized by ethical life are able to abstract themselves from that 
very life in order to understand right. According to Quante, morality 
and ethical life then assist abstract personality in its effort to become 
actual or concretized. The abstract right is therefore empty without 
moral reflection and an ethical community63. As Quante explains, the 
abstract person or will «necessarily implies a content that can only be 
found outside self-consciousness». This will has no content, and 
requires action or participation in the actual world. The self-conscious 
experience of  freedom therefore «presupposes the existence of  an 
external and immediately encountered world»64, and this world will 
necessary be filled with other persons who have also developed 
customs, ethics, and an ethical social life (Sittlichkeit).  
So, freedom of  the will in abstract right is a kind of  incomplete 
freedom: the free will must act within an actual world defined by 
morality (how the will considers itself), ethical life (how others 
61 B. O’Connor, «Ethical theory», in M. Baur (eds by), Hegel Key Concepts, 
Routledge, New York 2015, p. 72. 
62 L. Siep, «Constitution, Fundamental Rights, and Social Welfare in Hegel's 
Philosophy of  Right», in R. Pippin, O. Höffe, op. cit., p. 278. 
63 M. Quante, op. cit., p. 84. 
64 Ivi, p. 89. 
82
consider the will), and other persons65. As Quante observes, making a 
claim (say, to a certain item of  property) implicitly assumes that there 
are other persons who are “addressees” of  the claim66. In § 38 Hegel 
writes that abstract right is «limited to the negative – not to violate 
personality and what ensues from personality». Property, of  course, is 
what ensues from personality, so abstract right initially establishes a 
duty not to interfere with another’s property. This duty entails that 
«[a]n abstract right that contains a positive assertion in its external 
form (e.g., “the property of  a person must be respected”) depends in 
the final analysis on a prohibition» against the mistreatment of  others 
by, for example, stealing from them67. Quante concludes that the 
Hegelian right to property therefore formalizes the duty not to 
interfere with another’s property, but it also formalizes the right to 
attempt to acquire property without interference68.  
Benhabib writes that abstract right is Hegel’s term for natural 
right69, but also that the property and contract rights in abstract right 
are formal, meaning that property-owning persons are legal persons 
operating within a «formally correct procedure» consisting of  
«background norms and procedures» which «confer validity on the 
contractual relations», which are derived from the rights of  
personality and property70. For Benhabib, contractual relations 
«presuppose the non-contracted and non-contractual capacity of  
individuals to be treated as beings entitled to rights»71. This capacity 
permits persons to freely enter into contracts, and to transfer their 
right to property pursuant to contract. These proprietary rights are 
«stipulated prior to the act of  contract», and the only way a person 
can legitimately contract is if  they have full rights over the terms of  
the contract itself, which is typically concerned with how an item of  
property is to be acquired, used or transferred72. Contract rights, of  
course, are considered to be foundational for all liberal/market 
economies, and it is at this point that Hegel’s property and contract 
rights can be situated into a capitalist framework.  
 
65 Ibidem. 
66 Ivi, p. 92. 
67 Ivi, p. 94. 
68 Ibidem.  
69 S. Benhabib, op. cit., p. 160. 
70 Ivi, p. 162. 
71 Ibidem. 
72 Ivi, p. 163. 
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6. Abstract Right Within Capitalism 
 
For Benhabib, abstract right becomes the normative presup-
position of  «modern exchange relations», or capitalism, constituted 
by «the reciprocal transfer of  proprietary rights among formally equal 
property owners»73. According to Honneth, as Hegel developed his 
system from his youth to his composition of  Philosophy of  Right, he  
 
persisted in, or even held more strongly, the conviction that in such a 
culture of  communicative freedom, or “ethical life”, considerable space 
would have to be provided for that social sphere of  action in which 
subjects could each pursue their private interests reciprocally in 
accordance with the conditions of  the capitalist market74. 
 
In a capitalist or market framework, property is, of  course, the 
primary object of  trade75. Not only does Hegel clearly oppose the 
abolition of  private property (§ 46R, § 185R), he is severely critical of  
both the grounds for, and the effect of, Plato’s communism for the 
guardians of  the city. According to Kenneth Westphal, Hegel’s 
approval of  capitalism is qualified, but nevertheless «he did not 
oppose it and indeed based his political philosophy on a careful 
rethinking of  modern political economy»76. For Siep, Hegel believes 
that individuals can pursue their abilities and plans «only in the 
context of  the effectively private pursuit of  interests, involving the 
free choice of  profession or occupation and the private disposal over 
the means of  production»77. The modern era, Hegel writes in §261, 
promotes this private pursuit, in that modern human beings «expect 
their inner life to be respected» as much as we «expect to have our 
own views, our own volition, and our own conscience».  
73 Ivi, p. 161. 
74 A. Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, cit., p. 21. 
75 J. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 261. For Schroeder Hegelian property as traded in 
the market can be “fungible property” and can also serve as a mediator. As such, 
«modern commercial relations allow us to form relationships and community far 
beyond our family or clan».  
76 K. Westphal, «The basic content and structure of  Hegel’s Philosophy of  
Right», in F. Beiser (eds by), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1993, p. 240.  
77 L. Siep, op. cit., p. 284.  
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In Hegel’s view, writes Schmidt am Busch,  
 
[c]ontracts and market-like exchanges are not a possible 
institutionalization, but a necessary condition of  the realization of  
personal respect…In fact, individuals who exchange commodities for 
money as well as individuals who exchange labor for money or money 
for money “recognize each other as persons and property owners”. 
Therefore, commodity, labor, and capital markets can, in principle, be 
said to be (possible) institutionalizations of  personal respect (see § 80)78. 
 
Hegel clearly adopts Adam Smith’s theory of  the invisible hand of  
the marketplace when he writes that the system of  needs – the most 
basic system in civil society, consisting of  requirements for food, 
shelter, and other necessities – is best met in an economy where 
subjective selfishness turns into a contribution towards the 
satisfaction of  the needs of  everyone else. By a dialectical movement, 
the particular is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in 
earning, producing, and enjoying his own account, thereby earns and 
produces for the enjoyment of  others (§ 199)79. 
However, according to Peter Stillman, Hegel does not attempt to 
justify capitalism, which «simply follows from the play of  private 
property in civil society»80, nor does he provide an apology for it 
because he provides for extensive regulation of  property as well as 
the subjugation of  the individual to the state81, a subject that will 
occupy the final section of  this paper.  
So, ethical life – a social framework of  norms, laws, and practices 
that operate only because subjects actively participate in them – 
creates the possibility that persons might freely trade and contract for 
property (the actions of  abstract right) and also engage in moral 
reflection (the actions of  morality). Without ethical life, there is no 
free trade but only theft and barbarism, which are the products of  
failed moral reflection. For Stillman, Sittlichkeit is «rich in types of  
human relations, development, and freedom», and it is here that 
«[p]roperty must be aufgehoben, both preserved and transcended, so 
that Hegel can get from the property centered starting point of  
78 H.C. Schmidt am Busch, op. cit., p. 583. 
79 See also L. Herzog, «Two Ways of  Taming the Market: Why Hegel Needs 
the Police and the Corporations», in A. Buchwalter, op. cit. 
80 P. Stillman, «Property, Freedom, and Individuality», cit., p. 166, n2.  
81 J. Schroeder, op. cit., p. 284. In terms of  regulation, Hegel writes that the 
public has the right not to be cheated, which permits market commodities to be 
inspected by some kind of  public authority (§ 236).  
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abstract right to a Sittlichkeit that is institutionally pluralistic and 
varied»82. It is at this point that Hegel is able to reconcile abstract, 
individual right with different social contexts by situating ethical life 
prior to the exercise of  moral behavior, such as refraining from 
stealing and the enjoyment of  property rights. Moral obligation to the 
community, however, does not mean that the community takes 
priority over private property and the exercise of  abstract right: it 
means that the community has interests that the individual must 
respect, and, perhaps more importantly, the individual has interests 
(many of  which are protected by abstract rights) that the community 
must, in turn, respect as well.  
 
7. The Property Right and the State 
 
It should be clear that the kind of  society described by Hegel in 
these sections shares many features with contemporary societies 
driven by capitalist market economies. Hegel’s civil society, on the one 
hand, secures extensive property and contract rights by allowing 
persons the freedom to trade without significant state or regulatory 
oversight. On the other hand, because civil society is a Hobbesian 
«field of  conflict in which the private interest of  each individual 
comes up against that of  everyone else» (§ 289R), it is – like 
contemporary liberal democracies – marked by tension between 
private property and public welfare. For example, Hegel gives 
expansive authority to the police not only to prosecute and punish 
crime, but also to develop the corporations that are intended to 
provide assistance, as well as cooperation, mutuality, and ethical 
guidance, when markets fail. This guidance is, for Hegel, «crucial to 
offsetting the atomistic, self-seeking individualism basic to the aporias 
of  modern market societies»83. 
Although Hegel supposes a liberal conception of  the priority of  
subjective rights and private property, these rights do not extend into 
the political sphere. In terms of  private law – the statutes and 
common law jurisprudence that regulates ownership claims between 
individuals – Hegel’s conception appears modern and even liberal, but 
this portrayal ends abruptly when the liberal conception of  private 
property rights abuts public law, which is obligated to recognize the 
ethical priority of  the state and its unregulated sovereign authority 
over property. Hegel’s philosophy of  right seeks to protect individuals 
82 P. Stillman, «Property, Contract, and Ethical Life», cit., p. 208. 
83 A. Buchwalter, «Introduction», in id., op. cit., p. 4.  
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from one another, but not from the state itself84. Although there is 
significant conflict between individuals in civil society, there is no 
«tension between personal right and the governing power of  the 
state», and therefore, for Siep, no protection of  individual freedoms 
against the state’s monopoly of  power85. This is the «decisive limit of  
Hegel’s liberal outlook»86. For Siep, the «principal deficiency» inherent 
in Philosophy of  Right is just this failure to establish a defense of  
fundamental rights against the state.  
The contradiction between Hegel’s social and political conceptions 
of  property is apparent. Honneth is also aware of  this when he writes 
that individuals must be able to «possess an exclusive portion of  the 
external world, objects, or things (Sachen) (§ 42), in order to be able to 
actualize the preferences they have chosen without restriction». 
However, this «free-space of  subjective arbitrariness» is merely 
protected from «interference by other subjects who contest their 
possession»87, but not from interference by the state. In establishing 
this zone of  private property, subjects «must be willing to concede 
other subjects the same claim to unhindered actualization of  their 
personal freedom»88. Of  course, legal or abstract right is not 
unlimited or absolute, and it is in the transition to the later stages of  
morality and ethical life that individuals are said to «link one’s will to a 
conception of  a universal good»89.  
Even when the purely legal protections afforded to, for example, 
property rights, are reproduced in the «concrete person» of  civil 
society (§ 182) where the goal of  the administration of  justice is the 
«protection of  property» (§ 208), there is apparently no indication or 
stipulation in the Philosophy of  Right that state power in terms of  
property rights (and perhaps all rights) may or should be restricted or 
regulated at any level of  abstract right, morality, or Sittlichkeit. 
Whatever protections are afforded property rights at the 
intersubjective level between subjects are non-existent between 
subjects and the state. 
So, despite his recognition of  the clash of  private interests against 
one another, the conflict between persons and communities, and the 
84 L. Siep, op. cit., p. 287.  
85 Ibidem. 
86 Ibidem. 
87 A. Honneth, The I in We, Polity Press, Malden 2012, p. 26 (emphasis 
added).  
88 Ibidem. (emphasis added).  
89 Ivi, p. 27.  
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conflict between both persons and communities together against the 
state (§ 289), Hegel was unwilling to create the types of  protections in 
a public law that he found necessary in the private law. This is because 
Hegel cannot countenance the idea that an individual property right, 
or even the property right of  a community, can trump the superior 
right of  the monarchic state that he presumed was necessary. Because 
there is no «exchange of  equivalents» between citizens and state, there 
is no contract with the state, and states therefore cannot violate 
property or contractual rights. In the sections on contract (§§ 72-83) 
and specifically in § 75, Hegel explicitly denies that a contractual 
relationship – the kind advocated by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and 
Fichte – exists between the citizen within a state (a «contract of  all 
with all»), between the citizens (individually or as a «unity of  different 
wills») and the state, or between (for example) persons in a marriage. 
He also denies that the state originated for the purpose of  protecting 
private property «in opposition to the right of  the sovereign and the 
state» where «the rights of  the sovereign and the state [are] regarded 
as objects of  contract and based on a contract» (§ 75). This is 
because, for Hegel, the ultimate purpose of  the state is not «the 
security and the protection of  property and of  personal freedom» 
(§ 258). Civil society is tasked with the obligation to uphold these 
rights when they are violated by citizens to the detriment of  others, 
whereas the state is not obligated to uphold property rights. For 
Hegel, states simply are not obligated to respect this category of  
right. According to Avineri, «under no condition should the state be 
conceived as an instrument for the preservation and defence of  
property»90, and, furthermore, the «state can’t be mere executor of  
private, economic interests of  citizens»91. When the state proper is 
confused with civil society, it is purported to exist solely for the 
protection of  property – this, of  course, is Locke’s position. But that 
is not the goal of  the state, because, unlike property, the state is not 
optional. Consequently, Hegel’s state cannot be the product of  a 
contract between citizens or between citizens (as a collective) and «the 
sovereign and the government» because contracts and property 
originate in the arbitrary will of  persons (as an “optional matter”) and 
the state cannot enter into a contract with anyone because it does not 
possess an arbitrary will (see § 75A). Despite struggling against their 
fellow citizens, the Hegelian property owner does not struggle for 
90 S. Avineri, op. cit., p. 85. 
91 Ibidem.  
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recognition against the state92. Therefore, the end of  the state cannot 
be, as it is for Locke, the protection of  property: the end of  the state 
is the state.  
The authority of  the political state is most apparent in Hegel’s 
complicated approach to expropriation, where the private right to 
property at the level of  civil society confronts the public right of  the 
state, and where, in true dialectical form, the right is both preserved 
and uplifted, and, at the same time, it is cancelled or annihilated by 
the state. In § 46, Hegel writes that «private property may have to be 
subordinated to higher spheres of  right, such as a community or the 
state», but that this «cannot be grounded in chance, in private caprice, 
or private advantage, but only in the rational organism of  the state». 
So, after having normalized private ownership, Hegel recognizes that 
«exceptions may be made by the state», and the state «alone...can 
make them» (§ 46). This is clearly a recognition that the state may 
confiscate and expropriate property; however, state officials may not 
use expropriation as a way to personally profit from state action, nor 
that they can use it arbitrarily. They may, however, take property 
“rationally”93. So, despite his prioritizing of  private property, Hegel’s 
property theory constitutes what Benhabib calls a “Pyrrhic victory” 
because he «confined the validity of  contractual transactions to the 
civil or private sphere alone, and robbed contract arguments of  their 
political significance»94.  
 
92 As Fred Dallmayr writes, the struggle for recognition exists in civil society 
but not at the ethical level of  the state. F. Dallmayr, G.W.F. Hegel: Modernity and 
Politics, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1993, p. 106. 
93 Hegel also notes that the opposite can occur: the state can force 
collectively-owned property, such as monasteries, to be sold to private interests 
(§ 46), and state property in the form of  public memorials may become 
privatized by prescription (i.e. non-use), when their «indwelling soul of  
remembrance and honour» is abandoned (§ 64). Such was the case when the 
Reformation upset the tradition of  the publicly-supported Mass, where «the 
spirit of  the old faith […] had departed, and they [the buildings and property set 
aside for church functions] could consequently be taken possession of  as 
property». (§ 64 Addition). However, this only occurs when the state has 
withdrawn or alienated its own will from the public property and is not to be 
considered as any kind of  privileging of  private property rights against the state. 
94 S. Benhabib, op. cit., p. 177. There is an extensive literature regarding 
Hegel’s authoritarianism. See, e.g., Hegel’s Political Philosophy, ed. W. Kaufman, 
Atherton Press, New York 1970. 
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Conclusion 
 
Because Hegel fails to provide for rights between persons and the 
state, it cannot be said that the Hegelian state maintains an institution 
of  private property.  
What kind of  political state, then, both preserves and uplifts 
Hegel’s social ideas of  property and freedom? As I have shown, it 
cannot be the authoritarian, monarchical state that Hegel endorses at 
the end of  Philosophy of  Right. As Honneth has suggested, Hegel can 
still be profitably read without making a commitment to this 
unacceptable conception of  the state. To that extent, a Hegelian 
property theory, one in which Hegel’s «basic conception of  the state 
has been rejected in principle»95, can still provide robust social 
property rights with the understanding that, because those rights 
wither at the level of  the state, his property theory cannot be said to 
provide robust political property rights. Hegel’s basic conception of  
the state must therefore be rejected because it is not the kind of  state 
that maintains an institution of  private property, which, in order to 
protect the abstract property right against fellow citizens, must also 
protect that right against the state. In its place is the liberal, 
democratic, and capitalist state that Hegel gestures towards in his 
appraisal of  property and freedom and their operation within 
Sittlichkeit, and it is that kind of  state which preserves these rights 
against the state itself. By providing for property rights between 
private persons as well as between private persons and the state, it is 
this type of  state that permits Hegel’s idealized abstract property right 
to be the social and legal embodiment of  personality and freedom.  
 
 
 
95 A. Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy, cit., p. 19.  
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Abstract 
 
Per Hegel, la personalità si sviluppa principalmente attraverso il possesso, la 
proprietà e lo scambio di proprietà: la proprietà è quindi fondamentale affinché 
gli individui possano vivere la libertà come persone e per l'esistenza della 
Sittlichkeit, o della vita etica, all'interno di una comunità. Il libero scambio di 
proprietà serve a sviluppare le anche personalità individuali mediandone 
l’intersoggettività, per cui condividiamo l'esperienza soggettiva dell'altro 
riconoscendo la sua volontà e rispettandone la proprietà. Come ogni diritto 
giuridico, il diritto astratto di proprietà e la sua istituzione sono il prodotto dello 
Stato, che può pertanto rivendicare la priorità su di esso. Ciò evidenzia la 
dialettica inerente sia al concetto che all’esercizio del diritto, entro la quale il 
diritto privato di proprietà all’interno della società civile si scontra con il diritto 
pubblico dello stato, risultando sia nella conservazione ed elevazione del diritto 
e, al contempo, nella sua cancellazione o annientamento.   
 
Parole chiave: Hegel, proprietà, personalità, filosofia sociale 
 
For Hegel, personhood is developed primarily through the possession, ownership, and exchange 
of  property. Property is crucial for individuals to experience freedom as persons and for the 
existence of  Sittlichkeit, or ethical life within a community. The free exchange of  property 
serves to develop individual personalities by mediating our intersubjectivity between one another, 
whereby we share another’s subjective experience of  the object by recognizing their will in it and 
respecting their ownership of  it. This free exchange is grounded the abstract right to property 
which is defined by the liberal institution of  private property. Like all legal/juridical rights, 
the abstract property right and its related institution are productions of  the state, which can 
also claim priority over them. This prioritization reveals the dialectic inherent in the both the 
conception and exercise of  the right, in which the private right to property at the level of  civil 
society confronts the public right of  the state, resulting in both the preservation and uplifting of  
the right, and, at the same time, its cancellation or annihilation.  
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